We study the problem of unemployment benefit provision when the family is also a provider of social insurance. As a benchmark, a simple model is presented where risksharing motives govern intra-family transfers and more generous unemployment benefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-for-one. The model is then extended to capture the idea that the State has an advantage vis-a-vis the family in the provision of insurance because it can tax individuals, whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. In this case, the effect of State transfers on intra-family transfers is found to be more than one-for-one. Thus, somewhat perversely, both informal transfers and total insurance transfers to the unemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that the optimal Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the State at monitoring the job search activities of the unemployed.
I. Introduction
A large literature in economics has analyzed the problem of optimal unemployment benefit provision and the impact of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate (see Feldstein (1976 ), Baily (1978 , Shavell and Weiss (1979) ; important empirical papers are Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) , Feldstein (1978) , Nickell (1979) , inter alia). A review by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) has pointed out that a shortcoming of this literature is that it does not allow for several major institutional features observed in actual unemployment compensation programs around the world. One important factor that has been ignored is the potential of families as insurance providers. Yet, in a world without government, families may provide much of the social insurance available to people. This introduces several questions. If family members are bound together by insurance provision, will a more generous Welfare State increase total insurance available to people? Or will it crowd out insurance provided by families? How does this occur? Could the State make things worse by destroying informal insurance to such an extent that total insurance falls? What are the implications for the optimal size of the Welfare State? This paper attempts to provide some answers to these questions by linking work on the optimal Welfare State with that on informal (non-market) insurance activities of families.
The traditional approach in economics to modelling family activities follows Barro (1974) and Becker (1991) , and assumes altruistic preferences. Within this framework, attention has been given to how altruistic families may undo government actions by transfers between different generations. An alternative approach treats intra-family transfers as a counterpart to the exchange of services provided by family members. While this has long been the standard approach in anthropology, economists have only recently begun to apply the 'exchange model' to study insurance against uncertain longevity (Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) ), insurance against accidents (Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) ) and in-kind services (Bernheim et al (1985) , Cox (1987) ). This paper follows the non-altruistic approach to model family insurance against unemployment, and then introduces the 3 government as a second source of insurance. 1 An important problem in modelling insurance amongst self-interested members of a family is contract enforcement. Although exchange models, such as Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) , show intra-family transfers may not depend on altruism, they do rely on some level of mutual trust existing to avoid the problem of informal family transfers being legally non-enforceable. The problem is that if person A makes a private transfer to person B who has had an unlucky spell, B may not reciprocate when luck changes and A needs help. The State doesn't have this problem when running an insurance scheme since it can force lucky members to pay through the tax system.
2 Our paper follows Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) by assuming families can only use self-enforcing contracts. 3 We model informal insurance schemes as a group of individuals who interact repeatedly and punish defectors by excluding them from future risk-sharing arrangements. Hence the punishment for defection is autarky. The State is modelled as a second source of insurance, funded by taxation.
The main result of the paper is that State-provided unemployment benefits can crowd out intra-family transfers more than one-for-one. The intuition for this result is as follows: an increase in State-provided unemployment benefits would be followed by a one-for-one reduction in intrafamily transfers as families try to return to the initial level of risk-sharing. However, the increased generosity of State benefits makes defecting from the informal family risk-sharing contract more attractive. Hence, family transfers must be reduced even further to keep the informal risk-sharing contract incentive compatible. This result implies a dramatic departure from the predictions of 4 previous exchange and altruistic models. 4 The more than one-for-one crowding out result arises because the State changes the opportunity cost of belonging to a family. Thus, the Welfare State affects the amount of informal insurance that families can sustain by changing the punishment available for those who default (i.e. by changing the set of admissible contracts). This result is related to Rotemberg and Saloner (1985) on the business cycle's effect on collusive agreements, and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) on the interaction between explicit and implicit incentive contracts in firms. 5 Our work is also related to Attanasio and RΡos-Rull (1999) and Krueger and Perri (1999) .
Both papers solve for optimal non-stationary insurance arrangements when both public and private insurance exist.
Our paper also considers the realistic possibility that families have an informational
advantage (vis-a-vis the State) about the activities of their members. Specifically, we assume that families are in a better position than the State to know if unemployed members are actively searching for a job. The main result is unchanged: more generous State benefits crowd out intra-family transfers more than one-for-one. Not only does autarky become more attractive, but employed family members must now also pay higher taxes to support the greater numbers of unemployed due to the moral hazard problem. This result does not mean that the State should not provide social insurance.
The optimal size of the Welfare State when families are strong (in the sense that they can maintain a high level of insurance on their own) is zero. Increasing State benefits serves only to increase unemployment due to the moral hazard problem and collapse intra-family transfers. If families are sufficiently weak, however, it is optimal for the State to intervene and become the sole-provider of social insurance. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) first proposed the "peer monitoring view" of the family in a model where market insurance reduces the care an individual takes to avoid accidents, but nonmarket insurance may not have this effect due to the ability of members to monitor each other. They 5 do not allow for the informational asymmetry to affect the aggregate cost of risk (whereas in our model more generous benefits may increase the unemployment rate) nor do they consider problems of enforcement of informal contracts between family members. 
II. The Model
The economy is populated by M infinitely lived, risk-averse individuals who have instantaneous utility z(x)-c(e) where x is income (z x >0, z xx <0) and e is search effort (c e >0, c ee >0). Denote derivatives with subscripts. The life-time expected utility of an unemployed and employed worker are determined by:
6 A small literature in development economics has applied this 'peer monitoring view' to credit markets (see the review in Besley (1995) ). The present paper can also be seen as applying the literature on the public provision of private goods to the case of social insurance. The main papers in this literature focus on goods that cannot be consumed from both providers at the same time, such as education or health care (e.g. Besley and Coate (1991) ).
7 Policy debates already incorporate the idea that the optimal size of the Welfare State must take into account the importance of family networks: "Comparisons with the Asian tigers may be unfair -these countries can get away with lower social transfers because families tend to offer much greater support to their members than in industrial nations" (The Economist, April 6, 1996) .
respectively, where b is the level of total benefits paid to the unemployed, j is the outflow rate from unemployment into employment, r is the exogenous rate of time preference (or 'discount rate') and t is the exogenous inflow rate into unemployment. 8 The inflow rate is the stationary employment risk that workers desire insurance against. The net wage is W (=w-n), where w is the gross wage and n is the premium required to support the transfers. Solving (1) and (2) simultaneously gives:
and
Assume that people form networks of friends and relatives (called 'families') for the sole purpose of sharing labour income risk (as in Kotlikoff and Spivak (1980) ), families are identical and labour income risk is uncorrelated across members. 9 We assume saving is not possible due to the absence of a capital market, which may be an alternative way to deal with employment shocks. To the extent 8 The intuition for equation (1) is that the returns for the unemployed equal the flow of utility they receive from benefits, z(b), plus the expected capital gain of getting a job, whereby utility rises from A to B with probability j (and probability (1-j) no change occurs). Equation (2) says the returns from being employed equal the flow of utility one receives from the net wage, z(W), plus the expected capital loss of losing one's job, whereby utility falls from B to A with probability t. 9 Whereas the model imposes the exogenous assumption of non-correlation of labour income risk, family members may endogenously choose to ensure that most risk is idiosyncratic. Dasgupta (1993) reports work by Udry (1990) showing that even in very primitive environments, households diversify activities to reduce the extent to which their incomes are correlated with one another. Estimates of the share of idiosyncratic risk in the variance of total household income is over 75 per cent. that saving is also used to smooth such shocks, the effect of the development of capital markets on family risk-sharing arrangements may be similar to the Welfare State.
10 Private markets for unemployment insurance (UI) are assumed not to exist. Empirically, this seems plausible. Chiu and Karni (1998) state that "unemployment insurance is unique in that unlike other forms of insurance it has never been provided by the private sector" (see also Oswald (1986) and Atkinson and Micklewight (1991) ). The assumption of no private UI market has been widely made in the previous literature (see, inter alia, Bailey (1978) , Azariadis (1975) and Wright (1986) ). Chiu and Karni (1998) observe that private UI was not even offered when there was no public sector UI. Hence they argue that some fundamental problem, such as moral hazard, must be invoked to explain the near-universal absence of private UI (rather than just crowding out by the public sector).
We also assume families are large so that at all times a constant proportion of members are unemployed. 11 Thus, if a family has m members, (1-u)m will always be employed and um unemployed, where u is the family unemployment rate. Simulations of Kotlikoff and Spivak's (1981) model show that even small families with 3 or 4 members can achieve between 60 and 70 per cent of the risk-pooling welfare gain of market full insurance. Since we assume the number of family members is fixed, the Welfare State cannot affect the family by changing its optimal size. This ignores several issues. For example, by increasing the number of members, families can pool risk more efficiently. However gathering information about members' activities may grow harder in larger families. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) emphasize the risk-pooling advantage of the State relative to small families and the informational advantage of the latter. They show that informal insurance may be harmful. The reason is that it crowds out market insurance, replacing it with insurance that involves less risk-pooling. However if family insurers hold perfect information about their members' effort, informal insurance is beneficial. Since the focus of the present paper is on the consequences 10 The effect of insurance on precautionary savings is studied by Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak (1986) . 11 Evidence related to this assumption is provided by Peace (1979) . He reports that it is not possible for network members to have money in hand for several successive months "because networks must carry unemployed members on a recurrent basis" pg. 31. For work that analyses risk sharing without commitment and a small number of agents, see Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996) . of the State's advantage at enforcing contracts, rather than pooling risks, we assume large families.
The outflow rate from unemployment depends on the level of search effort, e, by unemployed family members. Labour market equilibrium implies that flows into and out of unemployment are equal: j(e)um=t(1-u)m. The steady state unemployment rate of family members is:
where j e >0. The State moves first, setting public transfers to maximize aggregate social welfare, taking account of the subsequent reaction of families. Each family responds by setting its own transfers to maximize the welfare of a random member. Hence, Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed. We study optimal stationary insurance arrangements, whereby fixed transfers are paid to the unemployed that do not vary over time or with an individual's history. These arrangements are studied for simplicity although they may not be the best ones for the family to use. outflow rate (and hence unemployment rate) is equal across all families (i.e. u=U). Families choose transfers to maximize welfare of a random member, given public transfers, subject to their budget constraint:
Substituting for the budget constraint, the First Order Condition (FOC) for families is:
The net wage, W, equals w-Ub/(1-U). Equation (7) implies that family members will be fully insured. 
Social Welfare: Enforceable Family Contracts
The State sets the level of public transfers and search effort to maximize social welfare, given its 10 budget constraint and the response of families:
Proposition 2: With no moral hazard and enforceable family contracts, the level of public insurance transfers to the unemployed is irrelevant to social welfare.
Proof: Families set transfers so that, regardless of public transfers, they are always fully insured (from FOC (7)). Substituting for constraints (i) and (ii) in the welfare function (9) In order to reflect the State's advantage at enforcing contracts, we make the following assumption: Assumption 1. The State can fully enforce risk-sharing contracts using the power to tax the employed. Families only have available self-enforcing contracts.
The problem for families now is that the promise of unemployed members to reciprocate transfers in the future is not credible as there is no legal enforcement of family risk-sharing contracts. 13 To overcome this problem, families enter informal contracts whereby members refuse to provide insurance transfers forever to anyone defaulting on their obligations to the unemployed.
Hence the penalty for default is to exclude the worker from enjoying family risk-sharing arrangements in the future. 14 This introduces a constraint on the set of informal contracts that are enforceable. Our trigger strategy consists of each employed member continuing to pay a premium, 
The term for V A states that employed defectors (those who stop contributing towards the support of unemployed family members) will be punished by not receiving b f should they fall unemployed.
15
The only transfer available for defectors will be what the State provides. Simplifying yields the condition:
a formal insurance market does exist. 14 We ignore other punishments that may be available to families, like stigmatizing defectors or depriving them of affection. Then playing a simple trigger strategy would not be optimal (see Abreu (1988) ). The possibility of renegotiation between the family and unemployed defectors is also ignored. Although noncooperation between the family and defector is credible (i.e. it is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame) the players could renegotiate to leave the punishment phase for an equilibrium where everyone is better off (see Farrell and Maskin (1989) ).
15 Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) give fuller descriptions of informal insurance arrangements.
12
Call equation (12) the "enforceability constraint". 16 If it cannot be satisfied for any b f >0, then families can provide no self-enforcing insurance arrangements for their members (whereas the State enforces the premium payments that provide for public transfers through its power to tax). 17 If the constraint can be satisfied for positive family transfers, then families may still be unable to achieve their desired full insurance due to the temptation of members to shirk on their premiums. The family problem is:
The family budget constraint is given by (i) and the enforceability constraint by (ii). Substitute for the budget constraint in the objective function, M. The solution is:
where M b f and F b f are the partial derivatives of M(.) and F(.) with respect to b f , and λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforceability constraint. When λ=0, the constraint is not binding:
16 The more general term is "incentive compatibility constraint". 17 We assume that the identity of the family member does not change the cost of defecting on them. Alternatively, we could assume that people have a distribution of affection across members of their family. This implies, for example, that it is more costly to defect on your brother than on your third cousin. The enforceability constraint then only binds for the two most distant members of the extended family. The intuition is that the present value of the future discipline, activated when a family member is discovered cheating, falls as the discount rate rises. Hence the discount rate can be used to measure family strength. For a sufficiently low rate, the present value of the future discipline can be made large enough to make it not worthwhile for any family member to defect on their premium payments.
Proposition 3 (More than One-for-One Crowding Out, Part I): Assume no moral hazard exists and that the enforceability constraint binds. Increases in public transfers crowd out family transfers by more than one-for-one.
Proof: See Appendix I. This result is driven by the properties of the enforceability constraint. Start from a position of equilibrium and consider an increase in public transfers. The immediate effect is that it improves the life-time utility of someone defecting from the family by reducing the cost of falling unemployed (see V A in equation (11)). For employed family members, the immediate effect is that they now find 14 they have too much insurance (see V F in equation (10)). By simply offsetting the increase in public transfers through a one-for-one reduction in family transfers, employed members would return to the same level of insurance they had before the State increased transfers. But this is no longer an equilibrium since defecting is now not so bad an option. Hence the family must further reduce transfers so that employed members still wish to be a part of future arrangements.
Since total transfers fall as public transfers rise, there will exist a level of public transfers, insurance on their own then a welfare optimum also occurs when public transfers are zero.
Proof: See Appendix I.
Consequently the welfare maximizing level of public transfers depends on family strength. 18 If families can enforce full insurance on their own, then the State can achieve the welfare optimum in two ways. It can set a low level of transfers, denoted b 1 P in Figure 1 in Appendix II, and let the strong families provide the difference between that level and full insurance through informal arrangements.
Increasing public transfers beyond b 1 P leads to lower total transfers and welfare (along curve AB). 
II. C. Non-enforceable Family Contracts and Moral Hazard Problems
In order to reflect the information advantage of families, make the additional assumption:
Assumption 2: The State cannot perfectly monitor the job-search activities of family members. Families now choose their own level of search effort, e, which determines the outflow rate from unemployment, j(e). The family anticipates the effect of changes in the level of search effort by its members on the family unemployment rate, u, but not on the aggregate unemployment rate, U. Hence a distinction now exists between these two variables that was not present in the previous section of the paper. Assume that the level of search effort by workers who defect from the family is chosen by these workers to maximise their own welfare outside the family. This more general case combines the relative strengths of both families and government:
whereas the State cannot perfectly monitor the activities of family members (which can lead to 18 The discount rate is a parameter in the model affecting the potential generosity of informal family insurance.
unemployment being a positive function of public transfers), the State has the advantage of enforcing contracts through the law. The problem for the family can be stated as:
The family budget constraint is (i). The full expression for the enforceability constraint (ii) is: 
where M e and F e are the partial derivatives of M(.) and F(.) with respect to e, and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforceability constraint (ii). If µ=0, this constraint is not binding: , e and µ). They define search effort and family transfers as functions of public transfers. In equilibrium, the aggregate unemployment rate, U, equals the unemployment rate within each family (i.e.
u=U=t/(j(e)+t)).
Proposition 5 (More than One-for-One Crowding Out, Part II): Assume that the enforceability constraint binds. When there exists a moral hazard problem, increases in public transfers still crowd out family transfers more than one-for-one.
Two factors drive this result. Starting from a position of equilibrium, if public transfers are increased the immediate effect is that it improves the life-time utility of a defector from the family by reducing the cost of falling unemployed. For employed family members, the immediate effect is that they now find they have too much insurance. By offsetting the increase in public transfers through a one-forone cut in family transfers, the employed can return to the same level of insurance they had before the State increased transfers. But since defecting from the family is now a better option, the family must further reduce transfers so that employed members still wish to be part of future arrangements.
This same factor also lead to the more than one-for-one crowding out result in Proposition 3.
However there is now a second factor arising from the moral hazard problem that reinforces this result. When the increase in public transfers leads to lower job search effort and hence higher unemployment, employed family members bear a greater tax burden to support the unemployed and become even more willing to defect. 19 As a result, the family must further reduce transfers to lower transfer premiums so that the employed members still wish to be a part of future arrangements.
19 Note that the moral hazard problem can lead to a falling outflow rate and rising unemployment as public transfers increase even when the enforceability constraint does not bind and families are fully insured. The reason is as follows: as the level of State transfers rises, the level of family transfers needed to maintain full insurance drops. However for lower levels of family transfers there is less benefit to each family from extra search efforts that only decrease family unemployment, u, but have no effect on the aggregate rate of unemployment, U (where total premiums are ub 
Social Welfare: Non-enforceable Family Contracts and Moral Hazard Problems for the State
The State sets public transfers to maximize social welfare, given its budget constraint and the response of families: Consequently, in contrast to the case presented in section II. B., there exists in general only one level of public transfers that yields a social welfare optimum. If families are sufficiently strong to provide full insurance for their members when the State provides zero transfers, then there can be no role for the State. Increasing public transfers serves only to lower welfare due to the moral hazard problem that arises when part of total transfers is paid by the State. Furthermore, even when families are not strong enough to be able to provide full insurance for their members, it may still be optimal for the State to withdraw from the provision of transfers. In Figure 2 in Appendix II, families set transfers equal to b 1 FAM (less than full insurance) and achieve welfare, S FAM , if the State provides zero transfers. When the enforceability constraint binds, increasing public transfers leads to reductions in total transfers (along AB), lower outflows from unemployment and reductions in social welfare.
Once families are completely destroyed, increasing public transfers further leads to increases in total transfers (along BC) but also increases in unemployment due to the moral hazard problem. If the highest level of welfare that the State can achieve along BC (equal to S PUB ) is less than S FAM , then it is best to leave families as the sole providers of welfare. Social welfare is depicted by curve A!W! in the second quadrant.
However, if families are sufficiently weak there is not just a partial role for the State. In fact, the State should become the sole provider of transfers. Curve DEC shows how total transfers vary with public transfers for weak families. When the State provides zero transfers, the maximum transfer level that can be enforced by families is b 2 FAM and they achieve welfare, S 2 FAM . Increasing public transfers has the double effect of collapsing family transfers and reducing outflows from unemployment. If the highest level of welfare that the State can achieve (at point W) exceeds S 2 FAM then it should become the sole provider of welfare. Social welfare decreases when public transfers exceed b PUB because the gains from better insurance are more than offset by losses due to higher unemployment.
III. Discussion, Extensions and Direct Evidence

III. A. Religion, Divorce and Birth Control
A reduced role for religion, as well as a more tolerant view of divorce and wider availability of birth control methods (e.g. the pill) may have all affected the temptation to defect from the family. In terms of our model, these social trends could be captured by changing the discount rate. This changes the level of unemployment benefits for which the enforceability constraint (equation (12)) binds. As the benefit level that can be informally enforced falls, it may become optimal for the State to intervene and take over responsibility for social insurance provision from the family. This provides a microeconomic rationale for the birth of the Welfare State. 20 However, if strong family ties exist naturally, the State's best response is to retain these ties (with the associated gains from peer monitoring) and opt out of welfare provision altogether.
Another factor that could alter the cost of defection, in addition to the discount rate, is a social stigma or moral cost, s, of being excluded from the family. This would add a positive term to the left-hand side of the enforceability constraint (12), which would bind when
, so reductions in the psychic costs of leaving the family are predicted to have the same effects (discussed above) as increases in the discount rate.
III. B. Single Mothers
The case of single mothers introduces the possibility that the cost of risk involves an indivisibility.
If a pregnancy occurs the mother may require a high minimum transfer (below which transfers are not valued by the recipient). It is possible that the amount of money/help the mother will need (e.g.
in terms of lodging/food) is so high that becoming a single mother is not an insurable risk given the family's contract technology. Technically, transfers are not self-enforceable as equation (12) cannot hold to cover the high minimum transfer required in the case of the risk materializing (i.e. pregnancy). However, if the State provides some help to single mothers it can make the risk insurable. Just below that crucial level, increases in the generosity of the Welfare State can increase informal transfers.
III. C. Politics
The paper may provide a natural interpretation for different attitudes of political parties towards the Welfare State. As mentioned in the introduction, parties that emphasize the role of families in society seem also to have preferences for low spending on welfare programs whereas political preferences for high welfare spending seem to go together with weaker concerns for "strengthening" family ties.
Our explanation is simply that these are the more efficient patterns in the sense that, for example, proposals for a generous Welfare State and measures designed to strengthen families would be offering too much insurance.
III. D. Extensions to the Model
If families are small they would be at a disadvantage relative to the State from a risk-pooling point of view. It is clear that it would then become optimal for the State to be the sole-provider of insurance both in Case I for "Enforceable Family Contracts" and in Case II for "Non-enforceable
Family Contracts".
For Case III, with both moral hazard and non-enforceable contracts, Proposition 6 will hold only for a sufficiently large number of family members, m (i.e. m greater than some minimum level, m 0 ). The risk-pooling advantage of the State becomes small for large m, whereas the adverse crowding out effects from higher public transfers approach more than one-for-one. It is also clear, however, that when families have few members (or when families are large but risks are highly correlated) there is some role for the State to provide insurance for families in those bad events when all members become unemployed at the same time.
Although the only social benefits of families in our model come from the provision of insurance against unemployment, a richer model would allow for other benefits arising from families.
Some examples include education and crime prevention. Another benefit of the family could be looking after the old. Whereas the model assumes that workers live forever, a more general set-up could allow for the presence of 'the young' who work and 'the old' who do not. As the young approach retirement from work they would be tempted to cheat on their premiums as the probability of falling unemployed themselves decreased. Consequently a way for the family to maintain itself could be to include provisions for the elderly. Anyone who cheated on their premiums could be denied these benefits. If the young had a high discount rate they may not wish to be part of such an arrangement. This may imply that some, but not complete, state-provided pension provision would 22 be socially optimal by allowing the family to maintain its informal arrangements.
The model also assumes that workers' wages are not subject to risky variation. However if wage income was risky and premiums paid by the employed were income-related, then the family may have a downside: members would have less incentive to take risks or invest in ways to increase their incomes.
III. E. Direct Evidence
There exists some evidence that the Welfare State displaces part of the functions of the family (see, for example, empirical work on army pensions by Costa (1997) ). 21 In England in 1901, 40% of the adult male population were informally insured against unemployment and sickness by "Friendly Societies". In some of these societies, failing with your subscriptions meant "you either make it up afterwards … or you forfeit your benefit altogether" (Lloyd George, Parliamentary Debates, June 1908). Gladstone (1999) writes about "… the impact of a more comprehensive supply of State welfare on the voluntary sector. The traditional view is that it declined both in influence and supply of services. There is certainly much to support that interpretation: the majority of hospitals were taken into State ownership, while the Friendly Societies lost their role to the civil servants of the Ministry of National Insurance; the voluntary sector found it difficult to compete as an employer, and there were fears that, with a more comprehensive welfare state, voluntary funds would dry up".
Although formal statistical tests are difficult, it is important to provide evidence consistent with the mechanisms in the model. We believe that the standard reports of unemployment benefit programs (e.g. the OECD Jobs Study (1994)) provide such evidence. The basic fact is that unemployment benefit replacement rates depend on family circumstances. The OECD Jobs Study provides data on unemployment benefit replacement rates for 21 countries, across 3 different family situations and benefit durations. Overall, for 32 out of 53 cases (or 60%) in which the State provides benefits, single people receive more State help than married people with working spouses. Perhaps the most extreme feature of our model is the result that the State should either opt out totally from the provision of social insurance, or provide such a generous level that insurance no longer becomes a motive for intra-family transfers. In 21 out of the 32 cases where there is less State help for people who can rely on their spouses, the State opts out completely from the provision of social insurance (i.e. the benefit replacement rate for married people is zero).
IV. Concluding Remarks
In the absence of the Welfare State families provide much of the social insurance available to an individual. Thus, in order to design the optimal Welfare State, we must first know the effect of public transfers on intra-family insurance. This paper uses the exchange model of the family (i.e. one based on non-altruistic preferences) to study unemployment insurance. Thus, all transfers within families occur because members expect, and receive, reciprocity when circumstances change. In the benchmark case, public transfers crowd out family insurance transfers one-for-one, so the existence of family insurance is irrelevant for the design of the optimal Welfare State. The model is then extended to capture the idea that family contracts are informal and not legally enforceable, whereas the State can use its power to tax the employed to support individuals on unemployment benefits.
If families can only use self-enforcing contracts, increases in the level of public transfers crowd out family transfers by more than one-for-one. By changing the penalty for defection from the family network, increases in public transfers reduce the set of self-enforceable contracts available to the family. In other words, total transfers to an unemployed individual fall as the generosity of the Welfare State increases. This is a dramatic departure from the predictions of traditional models.
We consider the possibility that our results are driven by modelling families as inherently weak (they are inferior to the State in terms of contract technology A simple message of the paper is that even if total insurance transfers available to an individual fall as the State increases the generosity of its welfare program (the more than one-for-one crowding out result), it does not imply that the State should not intervene in the provision of social insurance. We believe that the model shows a potentially fruitful way in which we can incorporate families into discussions about the optimal Welfare State.
since ∂V The term on the first line of this expression is negative due to diminishing marginal utility (provided j>j A ). This term captures the effect that more unemployment caused by higher public transfers has greater marginal disutility on employed family members than autarkic workers who only have to pay public (not family) taxes. The term on the second line is negative since it measures the effect on employed family members' life-time expected utility of decreases in unemployed members' job search effort. 
